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THE  TWO  SIDES  OF  THE  FORCE:
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  PRODUCTION  AND  APPROPRIATION*
There are two ways for homo economicus to make a living.  He can produce
useful goods and services for exchange with other producers –the way of
production and exchange– and/or he can try to appropriate a larger slice of whatever
others produce –the way of appropriation and conflict.  Until the 1960s, economics
was almost exclusively centered on analyzing production and exchange for which
it was enough to focus only on the bright side of homo economicus, that is, on his
propensity to exchange for what he wants.  Since then, interest in analyzing
appropriation and conflict has been increasing, exposing his dark side –that is, his
inclination to grab what he wants.  More recently, a synthesis of both analyses
has been driving the research on the governance of private and public transactions
as well as the growing consensus that almost all transactions need governance (in
the sense of a restraining influence over the parties to transactions).  Although
much remains to be done, a meaningful analysis of governance assumes the dark
side of self-interest and deals explicitly with the costs of appropriation and conflict.
This section contains three papers that illustrate progress in the economic
analysis of appropriation and conflict.  First, Herschel  Grossman looks at recurring
distributional disputes between social groups to determine the conditions for
their settlement through a self-enforcing constitution or for them to become never-
ending civil conflicts.  Second, Andrés Solimano discusses the threat of huge
losses due to civil conflict and terrorism with special reference to Latin America.
Given the limits to preventing the losses, Solimano looks at the complementarities
between private and public insurance to share them.  Finally, Edgardo  Barandiarán
high-lights the relevance of Aoki’s comparative analysis to explain the institutional
arrangements to protect property from autocrats (Olson’s stationary bandits) and
their implications for the emergence of the democratic state.
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